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In his excellent article, For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020?:
The Debate Over Corporate Purpose, Professor Edward Rock articulates his
understanding of the current debate over corporate purpose and surfaces four
separate, but related, questions that he views as central to that debate:
First, what is the best theory of the legal form we call
“the corporation”? Second, how should academic
finance understand the properties of the legal form when
building models or engaging in empirical research?
Third, what are good management strategies for building
valuable firms? And, finally, what are the social roles
and obligations of large publicly traded firms?1
He argues that what he calls “populist pressures” have led contestants to the debate
to confuse the separate questions he highlights.2 Professor Rock finishes by
fearing that these populist pressures could bring about changes to long-standing
principles of American corporate governance that would result in more harm than
benefit.
In this reply, I echo and applaud Professor Rock’s clear vision as to the
current state of corporate law in the United States. Professor Rock’s willingness to
be accurate about the state of affairs that actually exists is admirable, and all too
rare in a debate where many obscure what “is” to make it their “ought.” I also

1

Edward B. Rock, For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate Over Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS.
LAW. (forthcoming Spring 2021) (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst., Working Paper No. 515/2020; NYU Sch. L. Pub. L.
Research Paper, Working Paper No. 20-16, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589951 [hereinafter “Rock”].
2

Id. at 1.

admire Professor Rock’s willingness to shine a light on the academy, and its role in
bringing us to where we are, and in particular its obsessive focus on equating the
value of corporations to society with their expected value to those who hold their
equity capital—that is, to their stockholders.
Where I take issue with Professor Rock is that I do not source this debate to
the business elites whom he credits with pushing society toward a more
stakeholder-, and less stockholder-, focused conception of the corporate purpose.
It may be that these business elites are confused about his four questions, but that
is not fair to say of the advocates and scholars who have, for many years before
these elites spoke a word about stakeholders, believed that our corporate
governance system was out of whack and causing social harm.
And Professor Rock’s four questions are themselves in some way a natural
outgrowth of an elite academic culture that, as he admits, has largely looked at
corporate governance through a monocular lens focused solely on stockholder
welfare. His first two questions are largely hobbyhorses of law and finance
professors, while the third is the focus of business school courses. These may be
the lens through which law and economic elites look at the issue of corporate
purpose, but they are far narrower than that of the general public affected by our
corporate governance system.
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Professor Rock’s last question gets closer to the mark about the real causes
of the current debate; he suggests that those who have been driving the debate
since its inception are concerned with the “social roles and obligations of publicly
traded firms.”3 For sure, they are and have been.
But, even then Rock’s prism is too narrow. That elites like money managers
and the Business Roundtable (“BRT”) are recognizing that things need to change is
not because they have come to question the simplifying legal and finance models
that professors use to understand corporate law or the outcomes the corporate
governance system produces, nor is it because there are profound new insights into
management technique, linking business performance to articulated purpose.
Rather, they are doing so because the outcomes of a corporate governance
system that has increased the power of stockholders, in the form of institutional
investors, and decreased the power of workers and other corporate stakeholders are
unsustainable, both in terms of their effect on the environment and on the social
fabric. And the debate is not narrowly focused on just public companies, but
demanding more accountability from all societally influential private companies
whose actions have contributed to these problems. For at least 40 years, a strain of
economic thinking, typically embraced by those who believe that society is best
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served when corporations focus solely on making profits for stockholders, has
increased the power of economic elites and gone to war against the regulatory state
and externality protections put in place by the New Deal and Great Society to
protect workers, consumers, the environment, and society generally.
What has resulted is wage stagnation, growing inequality, climate change
that threatens humanity, repeated bailouts by the many of the few, consumer
exploitation, and increased insecurity, social division, and racial and economic
inequality. The late recognition of business elites that a corporate governance
system contributing to such results needs reform was not the start of this debate; it
was a signal that they knew that a long-standing debate threatened to come to a
head and produce outcomes that they could not control.
For decades now, there have been advocates and scholars bemoaning the tilt
in our corporate governance system, and the effect that the embrace of Milton
Friedman- and Ronald Reagan-style thinking has had on our economy’s basic
fairness and sustainability. It is the elites in business and in law and economics
scholarship who are catching up. They are not in the vanguard; they were slow on
the uptake, and the questions being asked are more fundamental and involve this:
Isn’t it time for all societally important business entities—not just public
companies, but large private companies and money management firms as well—to
have to use their power in a socially responsible manner? And if the current power
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allocation lets economic elites use corporate power to decrease the effectiveness of
the political process to protect corporate stakeholders, isn’t it necessary to address
the power and purpose dynamics within corporate governance itself so that they
align better with the outcomes we want for our society’s well-being and equity?
In my view, the answer to both questions is yes, and I further believe that the
most promising proposals to move our corporate governance system in a positive
direction do not involve a dangerous revolution. Instead, they involve a restoration
of balance that takes into account the different market, political, and resulting
power dynamics that exist in the 21st century and that would move the American
system of corporate governance into greater harmony with systems that exist in
many high-functioning market economies that compete effectively in the global
markets while producing better outcomes for the many.
Inaction and failure to take sensible steps forward is the real danger now,
and those stuck in a tired debate between what version of elite corporate rule
should prevail are the ones who are confused and risk social upset. With clear
eyes, sound consciences, and stiff spines, we have the capacity to make the
American corporate governance system evolve in a productive way. It is the
failure to admit that the current model is as Professor Rock describes, and to go
further than he will and admit that it needs an overhaul to fit a 21st century

5

economy, which long ago outgrew its ability to function fairly for the many, that is
endangering not just our economy, but the ties that bind us together as Americans.
I.

Roadmap
In considering how to reply to Professor Rock’s richly textured essay, it was

tempting to simply track his sections and comment upon his dilation of each of the
four questions he considers central to the current conversation about corporate
purpose. But after reading his article repeatedly, I decided to take a different
approach. There are two primary reasons for that. The first is that Professor
Rock’s characterization of the legal state of affairs and the predominant elite
academic take on the debate is characteristically measured, and I find far more to
agree with than to disagree. For the reader, therefore, an approach that simply
bought into his framework and considered the four questions he does as primary
would not be interesting. Second, and more importantly, by taking a different
approach, I hope to identify some perspectives on the debate that supplement
Professor Rock’s and to give readers some other ways of thinking about how we
got to where we are.
In particular, I wish to highlight the different way in which I see the origins
and the debate and the central questions our society faces about the purpose of
corporations, and of corporate governance more generally.
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To do that, I proceed this way. First, I address Professor Rock’s accurate
and balanced discussion of how the dominant corporate law in the United States—
that of the State of Delaware—addresses corporate purpose, and how other
models—including those in constituency states and under public benefit
corporation (“PBC”) statutes—do.4 This is important to the public policy
discussion, because, for far too long, too much time has been wasted in arguments
not grounded in reality about corporate law, instead of arguing about the real issue,
which is: whether and how that reality should change.
From there, I pivot to discussing the reasons why I do not find the four
questions Professor Rock identifies to be as central as he sees them to the public
debate over corporate purpose. In particular, I highlight ways in which the
questions themselves tend to perpetuate the viewpoint of academics who have
looked at the question of corporate purpose through a very narrow, and
stockholder-focused, lens.
I then move from the issue of legal and market reality to addressing
Professor Rock’s view of the origins of the immediate controversy. In doing so, I
note my view that Professor Rock has confused the elite’s late-arriving recognition

I do not burden the reader with a discussion of Professor Rock’s discussion of how constituency statutes operate,
or his recognition of the emerging public benefit corporation model. That discussion is equally balanced, and it is
not as subject to the same attempts at confusion that characterize the debate about what Delaware corporate law says
about corporate purpose.
4
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of the debate—a symptom—with the actual forces that have brought it about. I
argue that it is important to be clear about why the debate is occurring, if the
outcome of it is to be productive, and if it is not just to descend into small
arguments among the “haves” about just how little change the establishment can
get away with while remaining the establishment.
I turn from there to a discussion of the blinkered way in which many key
contestants to the debate are proceeding, by highlighting two key techniques used
by traditional corporate law that are not stressed by Professor Rock and that have
relevance to the policy debate. These techniques are: i) the use of the business
judgment rule to give directors and management more space to be other–regarding
toward stakeholders other than stockholders; and ii) the importance of normative
obligations imposed on directors, even when those obligations are not enforceable
by way of money damages. In highlighting these successful techniques, I suggest
that some of the pending policy proposals to move corporate law in a more
stakeholder-focused direction have more promise than left-wing skeptics think, and
pose less of a threat to traditional corporate law efficiency than Professor Rock or
more conservative commentators fear.
Finally, I finish by expanding on the same themes, and by differing with
Professor Rock to the extent that he contends that adhering to the status quo is less
risky than adapting our system of corporate law in an evolutionary way to address
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the needs of a 21st century market economy, in which the power dynamics are
markedly different than in the post-war era during which American capitalism
functioned most effectively for the many. By evolutionary means, which build on
current techniques of corporate law, and that restore the regulatory framework
within which corporate power used to be exercised, we can build a sounder basis
for sustainable prosperity and greater social unity, because we will create
incentives for our economy to more fairly share its gains with the workers whose
hard work and innovation is primarily responsible for creating them. And we can
also better align our corporate governance system with the interests of humanity in
ensuring that in trying to build wealth, we do not destroy the planet, injure
consumers, or otherwise cause more harm than good.
II.

Getting Real About Revlon: Professor Rock’s Accurate Description of
American Corporate Law
One of the most refreshing aspects of Professor Rock’s article is its balanced

and accurate statement of what Delaware corporate law says about the means and
ends of corporate governance. Great fiction is part of what makes human life
worth living, but obscurantism and deception about what the law is undermines the
ability of society to make good decisions about how the law should evolve.
As Professor Rock explains, the rule in Delaware is plain: corporate
fiduciaries may take actions benefiting other corporate stakeholders so long as

9

there are “rationally relat[ing] benefits” to the stockholders, as famously expressed
in the Delaware Supreme Court case Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.5 This rational relationship test is the general rule and not a rule that
applies in only one situation.
Those who say that portion of Revlon is dictum or does not state the general
rule of Delaware law do not understand what it means for something to be essential
to the resolution of the case.6 In fact, it is not clear to me that they have ever read
the full case. For starters, they ignore the fact that no constituency could have been
more sympathetic to a stockholder primacy advocate than the Revlon noteholders.
Why? Because they had gotten their notes weeks before the end stages of the
bidding contest for Revlon, when they were advised by the board that it was in

506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) (“Moreover, while concern for various corporate constituencies is proper when
addressing a takeover threat, that principle is limited by the requirement that there be some rationally related benefit
accruing to the stockholders.”).
5

6

As a judge for 21 years, I had to deal with the reality of Revlon as precedent, and as a professor during the same
period at Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania Law Schools, I always had my students read the full series of
cases running from Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) to Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC, 637 A.2d 34
(Del. 1994), in more or less full form, with especial emphasis on Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946 (Del. 1985) and Revlon. Early in this century, I explained in full the difficulties I perceived that Revlon caused
for the ability of boards to protect other stakeholders. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Board of
Directors and Stockholders in Change of Control Transactions: Is There Any ‘There’ There?, 75 U.S.C. L. REV.
1167 (2002). Others have argued the same. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for
Shareholder Primacy, 75 U.S.C. L. REV. 1189, 1197–99, 1205–07 (2002) (arguing that Revlon is bad for diversified
investors as a class because a rule allowing stockholders to cash out and ignore the interests of other stakeholders
discourages prior-period firm-specific investments by those stakeholders to the detriment of overall value creation
by corporations).
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their interests as stockholders to exchange some of their shares for notes, and that
the value of the notes would be protected by the independent directors.7
So when the Revlon board argued that it was favoring the bidder that would
provide the best price for stockholders while protecting the value of the notes, the
board knew that many Revlon stockholders now had a Revlon portfolio consisting
of both stock and notes, and that they only owned the notes because the board
encouraged them to accept them on the promise of value protection. After the
statement by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal that boards might have the
discretion to give stakeholder interests equal weight in mergers and acquisitions
(“M&A”),8 no doubt the Revlon board and its legal advisors thought they were on
solid legal ground in arguing that fairness to noteholders could be taken into
account in their decision-making.
But, as we know, the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon firmly rejected that
idea. And its reasoning was clear, whether one agrees with it or not. Because the
Revlon board was selling the company for cash, it was the final opportunity for
stockholders to profit from their investment. That being so, there was no way that
protecting the value of the notes could have a rational relationship to the best

7

Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177.

Unocal, 493 A.2d. at 955 (suggesting that a board could reject a takeover bid based on its “impact on
‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (that is, creditors, customers, employees and perhaps even the community
generally”)).
8

11

interests of stockholders, and thus the board was breaching its fiduciary duty of
loyalty by preferring the interests of the noteholders to those of the stockholders.9
This rational relationship test was in no way incidental to the holding—it
was crucial. Had Revlon been selling a division to which the value of the notes
were tied, a decision to accept a bid that protected the value of the notes could have
been rationalized on the ground that it would benefit stockholders in the future, as
the company would likely need debt financing, and thus it would benefit
stockholders for the company to maintain a reputation for treating its noteholders
well since that would help the company get favorable financing terms in the future.
But because Revlon was selling the entire company, and there was no tomorrow,
the generally forgiving rational relationship test could not be satisfied, and the
board lost.10

9

Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
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Id. at 182-83. Admittedly, there is a different way to understand Revlon: that the board did not even-handedly
deal with both bidders for the benefit of the stockholders and noteholders, but instead locked up a deal with
Forstmann because of the antipathy its management and board had toward Ronald Perelman. Id. at 175 (noting the
Revlon’s CEO “strong personal antipathy” for Perelman). But it would have been easy to write the decision in that
way without relying on the need in a sale—because of the lack of a relationship between noteholder and stockholder
welfare—to focus solely on stockholders, and the Court’s holding hinged on that reasoning.
Folks who give short shrift to Revlon often fail to cite to the Delaware Supreme Court’s own statement that it
viewed itself as addressing for the “first time the extent to which a corporation may consider the interests of
constituencies other than shareholders,” to which it gave a clear answer: “while concern for various constituencies
is proper when addressing a takeover threat, that principle is limited by the requirement that there be some rationally
relating benefits accruing to the stockholders.” 506 A.2d at 176.
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Say what you will about the rational relationship test, but don’t say it’s
dictum.11 The reason why the movement for anti-takeover and constituency
statutes took on so much prominence is because critics of Revlon, like Marty
Lipton, knew that the Delaware Supreme Court had rejected giving boards the
discretion to treat stockholders as just one among many equal stakeholders, and
had done so in a way that substantially limited the ability of boards to protect
stakeholders at a critical point in time to them: when the business will go under
the control of new management.
Relatedly, Professor Rock also makes clear that his understanding of the
Delaware general rule is not idiosyncratic.12 He grounds his view in the governing
source of corporate law and its stockholder-focused power framework, the
Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”), showing that it grants rights only
to stockholders and is written to protect their interests. Rock then shows how the
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In earlier work, I addressed this issue at more length, and cited and addressed the arguments of the many scholars
who claim that Delaware’s common law of corporation law is ambiguous on this issue of purpose, and also
underscored the critical importance of the Delaware General Corporation Law’s power structure in understanding
Delaware law. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need For a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the
Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 477 (2015).
12

Because he is focused on Delaware common and statutory law, Professor Rock does not cite distinguished
scholars like Robert Clark, Stephen Bainbridge, Jonathan Macey, Mark Roe, and Roberta Romano, who take a
similar view to his of what traditional corporate law’s view of corporate purpose is. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate
Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in Eroding “We the People’s” Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51
HARV. C.R.– CIV. LIBERTY L. REV. 423, 440 n.63 (2016) (citing each scholar’s views to this effect). For another
recent article addressing the debate within academia about corporate purpose with clarity, see Mark J. Loewenstein
& Jay Geyer, Shareholder Primacy and the Moral Obligation of Directors (U. Colorado L. Legal Stud., Research
Paper No. 20-52, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3689979 (2020).
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Delaware judiciary has understood that statute. If you don’t agree with Vice
Chancellor Laster’s view,13 he directs you to Chancellor Chandler.14 If you don’t
agree with Chancellor Chandler, he points you to Chancellor Allen.15 If you don’t
agree with the Court of Chancery, there is a unanimous decision of the Delaware
Supreme Court to the same effect.16 These distinguished judges had very different
judicial approaches and writing styles, but they all agree on what Delaware law
means.17
If observers would like Delaware law to be different than it is, then it is time
for them to acknowledge reality and to do the hard work to advocate amendments
to the DGCL to make it as they wish it was. That is what the advocates of the
Delaware PBC statute did when they passed a law giving corporations the option to
In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3D 17, 40–41 (Del. Ch. 2013) (V.C. Laster) (“[T]he duty of loyalty . . .
mandates that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the benefit of stockholders.”);
see also In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holder Litig., 88 A.3D 54, 80 (Del. Ch. 2014) (same).
13

14

Rock, supra note 1, at 8 (citing eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.2d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (V.C.
Chandler)).
Rock, supra note 1, at 8 (citing TW Services, Inc. S’holder Litig., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 19, at *21 (Del. Ch. Mar.
2, 1989) (V.C. Allen)); see also Paramount v. Time, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at *22 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989)
(V.C. Allen) (noting the board has a “duty to seek to maximize in the long run financial returns to the corporation
and its shareholders”), aff’d, 571 A.2d. 1140 (Del. 1989) (V.C. Allen); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879
(Del. Ch. 1987) (V.C. Allen).
15

16

N. American Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 100 (Del. 2007).

17

It should not be forgotten in this discussion that many stockholder primacy advocates were upset that Delaware
did not embrace their “means” argument in cases like Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153
(Del. 1989) (giving a strong hand to directors to reject takeover bids and issuing dictum harshly criticizing the ruling
in City Cap. Assoc. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) that put limits on the ability of a board
to use a pill to block a non-coercive bid permanently), that stockholders should be able to dictate what is best for
them in mergers and acquisitions, and not be subject to fiduciary blocks on their ability to sell. This “means” debate
has often confused the debate about the “ends,” as scholars like Stephen Bainbridge have shown. See Stephen
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 N.W. L. REV. 547, 547–52 (2003).
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embrace a mandatory stakeholder model of governance. If the managerialists who
prefer a general “may” regime such as exists in constituency states want to
overrule the rational relationship rule of Delaware law, they must do so, as has
happened in 33 other states.18 Professor Rock does a service by putting paid to
those who continue to obscure the reality of what Delaware law is, and thereby to,
intentionally or unintentionally, impede making progress on what that law could
be.
III.

Professors and Their Models: The Real World Consequences of
Ignoring the Way the Real World Works
As someone who has spent a lot of time around corporate law and finance

scholars during the last quarter century, it is not surprising that Professor Rock
views the current debate as centering around these questions:
First, what is the best theory of the legal form we call
“the corporation”? Second, how should academic
finance understand the properties of the legal form when
building models or engaging in empirical research?
Third, what are good management strategies for building
valuable firms? And, finally, what are the social roles
and obligations of large publicly traded firms?19

18

Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 93 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (finding 33 states with constituency statutes in force during the period from 2000 to 2019). An
additional 38 states, including the District of Columbia, have passed PBC legislation. WHY PASS BENEFIT
CORPORATION LEGISLATION, BENEFIT CORPORATION, https://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/why-pass-benefitcorporation-legislation.
19

Rock, supra note 1, at 1.
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I find these questions unintentionally revealing, especially in an article that
is in many ways refreshingly clear of academic cant. The first question, by way of
example, seems one that only professors would put the way Professor Rock does.
Most statute writers and policy makers do not think about the best theory in that
verbiage; those who are focused on the right thing—positive and fair public
policy—think about what structure of regulation or governance will produce the
most socially desirable outcome. In this domain, my sense is that the real-world
participants to the debate divide on this basic question: is it better for society if
corporations focus solely or mostly on making profits for stockholders? Or should
corporations focus in equal measure on treating all their stakeholders with respect?
From this, they then proceed, or should, to more instrumental questions, such as
what allocation of powers to various corporate stakeholders best facilitates their
view of the good? In this calculus, I dare say most drafters of corporate law
statutes have had little regard for late-arriving theories like “nexus of contracts” or
the “associational model.”20 They have historically drawn analogies to techniques
of direct and republican democracy to channel the exercise of corporate power.21
20

See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs,
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (setting forth nexus of contracts theory of the firm).
21

Some scholars resist this notion. The scholarship of Nikolas Bowie undermines their position. See generally
Nikolas Bowie, Corporate Personhood v. Corporate Statehood, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2009 (2019) (reviewing ADAM
WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018)) (describing the
connection between the charters of colonies and corporations, and how their development has been influenced by
political philosophy). Interestingly, those who do so often find an article written by Michael Jensen and William
Meckling in the year of the bicentennial a source of inspiration and novel insight. See Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.

16

Likewise, Professor Rock’s second question—“how should academic
finance understand the properties of the legal form when building models or
engaging in empirical research”—is one specific to law and economic scholars, not
policy makers. But that question and the third—what are good management
strategies for building valuable firms—underscore just how influential academic
framing can be in skewing not only academic thought itself, but public policy. The
second question, for example, uses the “properties of the legal form” as a building
block for how finance professors should think about the value of corporations. But
if that means that finance professors should assume, by way of example, that what
is important in valuing firms is only their value to the holders of their equity, then
the model they build will tend to reflect that. Similarly, if the value of the firm to
society is equated with solely its value to stockholders, that will affect what is a
“valuable firm” and what management strategies best create them.22
To this point, one of the most interesting parts of Professor Rock’s paper
was his discussion of how elite finance professors and their law school

305 (1976). This article is, in essence, a recitation of how, with the right use of checks and balances, disaggregated
investors can productively entrust their capital to centralized management. This was the same problem that the
Federalist Papers and that thinkers like John Locke and Henri Montesquieu had pondered in forming a national
government, and corporate law statutes employ many of their same tools.
22

In another paper, Professor Rock focuses more deeply on the connection between business purpose and firm
outcomes, and cites scholars such as Claudine Gartenberg, Andrea Prat, and George Serafeim, who show that
purpose-driven companies create more value by focusing on stockholder-focused metrics, like return on assets and
Tobin’s Q. Edward B. Rock, Business Purpose and the Objective of the Corporation (NYU L. & Econ. Research
Paper, No. 20-44, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3724710.
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counterparts look at the value of corporations. Professor Rock persuasively shows
that the predominant way to measure the value of a corporation to society is just to
figure out the value at which its equity will sell. Even more sophisticated metrics
than just current stock price, such as Tobin’s Q, ultimately focus on figuring out a
proxy for the value of a company to just one constituency—stockholders.23
Another way that these measures have historically affected the debate about
corporate purpose is not discussed by Professor Rock, but his incisive essay alludes
to it. In discussing his third question about the relationship of purpose to corporate
value in a related essay, Rock cites literature that attempts to show that
corporations with a clear purpose beyond just profit—some mission of making the
world a better place, if only by the quality of the products or services sold—are
more valuable.24 But the measures of values used are ones traditionally associated
with stockholder value. This method of measuring value has long had a distorting
effect on the purpose debate. As far back as Marty Lipton’s iconic Takeover Bids
in the Target’s Boardroom article,25 advocates of stakeholder governance have
tried to show that their view of the world is actually better, not just to diversified
investors, but to a hypothetical stockholder who is long just the particular company

23

Rock, supra note 1, at 17.

24

See Rock, supra note 1, at 20–23.

Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 108 (1979) (explaining that
“shareholders have profited in the overwhelming majority of defeated takeovers”).
25
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that is subject to a takeover or an activist campaign. They do so by trying to show
that takeover bids and activism were not associated with higher firm values based
on metrics solely addressing stock price over some time horizon.26 As some of the
scholarship Rock averts to in the debate about corporate purpose and value
illustrates, this essential framing of the debate continues, with the fight being over
whether a focus on short-term stock price maximization is likely to foster or harm
long-term value creation.27 But even this framing necessarily tilts the debate by
making advocates of stakeholder governance play uphill and against the wind.
Even from the standpoint of stockholders, a focus solely on one target company’s
fate, rather than the effect of corporate governance rules on overall outcomes

26

In prior work, I collected abundant citations to scholars on both sides of the debate on the question of whether
activism increased or decreased firm value, almost of all which use share price or share price proxies for that
purpose. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge
Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1938-42 (2017); Strine, The
Dangers of Denial, supra note 11, at 787 n.102 (collecting scholarly articles on this and related subjects, such as
whether “say on pay” increases shareholder value).
Some scholars have even tried to analyze whether corporate governance changes proposed by policy makers, such as
Securities and Exchange Commission’s proxy access proposals, or made by judicial decisions, such as Airgas, Inc.
v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1194-95 (Del. 2010), were good for stockholders by doing event studies
about the correlation of the stock market to those decisions. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Measurement Issues in
the Proxy Access Debate (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Gov. Stanford U., Working Paper No. 71; Stanford U. L. Sch. L. &
Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 392, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1538630
(discussing empirical data indicating that the SEC’s proxy access proposal reduced shareholder wealth); Bo Becker,
Daniel Bergstresser, & Guhan Subramanian, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from
the Business Roundtable’s Challenge, 56 J.L. & ECON. 127 (2013) (same); Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How
Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value?: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627, 628–
35 (2013) (finding that the Chancery Court’s decision in Airgas, upholding a shareholder-initiated bylaw
amendment to accelerate the date of the next annual shareholder meeting and thus shorten the terms of staggered
directors, positively impacted firm value, while the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision reversing course negatively
impacted firm value); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409
(2005) (finding that staggered boards are associated with lower firm value).
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Rock, supra note 1, at 20.
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relevant to investors, is wrongheaded. For diversified investors, the system that is
most beneficial is the one that produces the most sustainable growth in stock value,
net of externalities they must bear.28 Profits at one company, because it received a
premium, may not matter if the buyer was another company whose stock the
stockholder also held, and if the combined companies then struggle with excessive
debt or because the combination did not make sense. And of course, most
investors do not own just stock—they also hold debt as a substantial portion of
their portfolio, and governance rules that promote equity value at the expense of
debt holders may at best involve a value shift, and worse.29 Put simply, simplified
models that are based on the assumption that a corporation’s value can be equated
with its equity value distort good thinking about corporate governance.30
Further to this point, Professor Rock gives a bit less prominence to an
accompanying assumption that many of the scholars who do this use to salve their

For an emerging voice’s incisive perspective on this, see Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner,
95 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2020).
28

29

Strine, Wolves, supra note 26, at 1938–42 (collecting studies suggesting that gains to stockholders from activism
do not result from increases in firm value but transfers of value away from workers and creditors to stockholders,
and that activism may lead to decreased R&D spending).
30

This is why Professors Hart and Zingales, cited by Professor Rock, propose that companies focus on making
decisions maximizing the overall welfare of presumably diversified investors. Rock, supra note 1, at 18 (citing
Oliver Hart & Luis Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J. L. FIN. &
ACCT. 247 (2017)).
Similarly, for an excellent article arguing that pension fund trustees should not only be allowed but required to
consider the broader economic interests of their fund beneficiaries in key issues, such as preserving their jobs, in
governing the fund, see David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 NYU L. REV. 2106 (2014).
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consciences, and to silence the noise from their brain that screams the obvious: the
value of a corporation cannot be reduced to just the price its equity would sell for.
That moral balm comes out of the residual claimant theory. A simpler intellectual
compound has perhaps never been conceived. It rests on the idea that as a matter
of law, creditors get paid before stockholders. For stockholders to profit, all
creditors must be satisfied. Therefore, if we run corporations in a way that
maximizes the surplus for stockholders, that will be best for the world, because all
other corporate claimants will get their just desserts, and by seeking to grow the pie
to benefit stockholders, the maximum social benefit will result.31
That not much of this is close to true has not mattered much in turning
scholars toward the more complex inquiries that are necessary to measure the realworld value of and, just as important, the costs imposed on society by specific
firms. If the way the world worked was that stockholders could harvest every ten
to twenty years, perhaps the residual claimant theory would have some power. In
that kind of summing-up, workers who had relied upon corporate promises and had
made sacrifices would be treated fairly and get their due. Communities that gave
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For a good description of the basic argument for this perspective, see William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic
Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 269–70 (1992). For a succinct takedown of the
residual claimant model, see Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, supra note 6,
at 1192–95. For other incisive takedowns of the residual claimant model, particularly from the perspective of
whether stockholders are more exposed to risk than workers as residual claimants, see Kent Greenfield, The Place of
Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 302–11 (1998); William Lazonick, Labor in the 21st Century 32–
33 (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 4, 2015).
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tax subsidies and other benefits to companies would get repaid for broken
promises, or have the corporation be forced to honor them. Creditors who got
short shrift would get trued up. Consumers who were injured would get
compensated. Environmental damage would be remediated. Only then would the
stockholders feed.
But that is not the way the world works. Diversified stockholders in fact
bear less firm-specific risk than most other stakeholders, particularly corporate
workers, small creditors, pensioners, and corporate communities who cannot
diversify away the risk of getting shafted. And stockholders take all the time.
They take when M&A and other activist-driven events occur. They take when
they benefit from dividends and buybacks. And after these events, the
corporations involved have not infrequently gone insolvent, downsized due to
excessive leverage, shirked pension plans at the expense of pensioners and
taxpayers, left communities out substantial tax dollars and without the benefits
they were promised for forsaking them, and caused environmental and consumer
harm that is not fully remediated.
To be fair to my friend Professor Rock, he mostly averts to the academic
models to say that they reflect an insight into what elite finance scholars believe is
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the purpose of for-profit corporations.32 Because their models all focus on
stockholder value, he rightly argues that this suggests that they believe the purpose
of corporations is primarily to benefit stockholders.33
But Professor Rock’s acknowledgment that ideas and ideology matter34 also
suggests that the unthinking perpetuation of these models has itself contributed to a
mistaken approach to corporate governance that embraced the idea that making
companies more and more responsive to stockholders was a good thing. If
something had the effect of durably raising stock prices, then it must have been
positive.35
Lost in this, of course, is the reality that the measure of a company’s equity
value just comprises the collective view of traders as to what they can extract as
stockholders from a company. If the workers of a company can be squeezed
successfully, so that there is more for its stockholders, then the equity value goes
up. If a company’s environmental compliance is less costly and effective than
other competitors and tolerated by local regulators in its pockets, its equity value
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Rock, supra note 1, at 17–19.

33

Id. at 15–19.

34

Id. at 22.

Admittedly Professor Rock says that the question for finance scholars “is how firms are actually managed” and
that their measures assume that the answer to that question is for the benefit of stockholders. Id. at 18. But
Professor Rock’s framing question is larger, and equating firm value solely with the value to stockholders is
problematic not just normatively, but as an accurate description of economic reality.
35
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can go up.36 The reason is simple: what the market is measuring is simply what
traders think stockholders can get out of investing.
That narrow measure has no compelling relationship to the overall value that
a corporation provides to society. A company that provides a six percent return to
equity, but that employs 10,000 workers at fair wages and in safe conditions in all
its global operations, uses only contractors who do the same, and creates no
externalities may well provide more value to society than an industry competitor
that provides a nine percent return to equity, but employs far fewer workers
directly and at much lower wages, that relies on even lower paid contracted labor,
takes few safety protections, and generates externalities such as consumer and
environmental harm. Companies can be very competitive in product markets, but
decide how to use the proceeds in a way that is much more distributionally useful
to society and creates real economic value. And companies can and often have
done the opposite, yet the increased value of their equity does not get discounted
for the harm done, because the stock market does not care about that—at least until
the company gets caught and there is some short-term sell-off. Importantly,
because corporate power has been used to undermine the regulatory protections for
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E.g., Roy Shapira & Luigi Zingales, Is Pollution Value-Maximizing? The DuPont Case (Nat’l Bureau Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. w23866, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3046380 (showing
that it can be valuable for stockholders for companies to pollute and create harm if the expected gains outweigh the
probability of regulatory detection and action sufficient to strip the company of its gains from improper conduct).
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stakeholders, the probability that corporate wrongdoing will be punished in a way
that makes overreaching more harmful to stockholders than beneficial to them has
diminished. In sum, equity value prices this lack of stakeholder protection as a
positive, not a negative.
The overall corrosion of this obsession with equity value is also
underestimated. By measuring value in a cramped manner that does not take into
account important elements of real economic value to society—providing workers
with the ability to live decent lives and with the financial resources to spend on
goods and services that in turn produce more growth—and that does not take into
account costs—externalities imposed on taxpayers, workers, consumers, and
diversified investors—these models create a collective incentive for more
responsible companies to be more callous to workers, consumers, creditors, the
environment, and their communities so that they can compete with companies all
too happy to please the stock market by shorting stakeholders and taking
regulatory shortcuts.
Not only that, but the single-minded focus on company-specific equity value
obscures the question of whether the sum total of each company’s rent-seeking is a
gain or drag on overall economic growth and social welfare. The sum total of
stockholder gains resulting from corporate externalities is not a gain in societal
wealth; it is a shift of ill-gotten gains to stockholders. And because stockholders
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are much wealthier than average, this involves an unfair shifting of money from
those who have less to those who have more. And it fundamentally involves
diverting societal resources that could do greater good to remediating corporate
harm, or leaving the injured to take care of their own wounds. Furthermore, the
more companies can generate profits by shorting stakeholders and skirting the law,
the less they are driven to improve their products and services in a way that creates
the potential for a more prosperous society. A society where corporate rentseeking instead of ingenuity becomes more prevalent faces, as Professor Coates so
rightly calls out, the risk of becoming Russia.37 Models that simplify away
anything but what stockholders expect to receive increase that risk, and the current
societal debate about the purpose of the corporation is a rebellion in at least some
meaningful part against the failure of elite academics to evolve their models to take
into account the real world. The strong push for companies to disclose more
information about employee, environmental, social and governance (“EESG”)
factors is just one manifestation of dissatisfaction with the equity value proxy.
Finally, the reasons to be suspicious of equity value as a proxy for overall
value have grown considerably. With advances in technology and globalizing
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John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST.
COMMENT. 223, 224 (2015). Professor Coates sums up the corporate rent-seeking race nicely, worrying that the
concerted efforts of big corporations to tilt the regulatory system in a direction that serves their selfish interests
“risks economic harms—a package of risks one could call (with some but only some exaggeration) ‘the risk of
Russia.’” Id. In other words, it leads to a crony capitalism that lacks fairness, integrity, and dynamism.
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markets, the prosperity of a company, its top managers, and its stockholders need
not coincide with gains in employment in its headquarters community, an
expansion of its worldwide direct workforce, or other positive externalities such as
increases in its charitable giving. Instead, it can involve huge gains for a small
number of key employees, a large market cap, and the company’s conducting its
business through contracted labor lacking the wages, benefits, and conditions of
employment we would want our children and grandchildren to receive.
Corporations not only often have no local identity; they have even been willing to
abandon their nations in tax-avoiding inversions. If more people are unwilling to
indulge the idea that the “value” of these socially important institutions can be
summed up in their stock price, they have good reason.
IV.

The Sources of the Current Debate: The Justifiable Concerns and
Discontent of the Many, Not the Late-Coming Recognition of Elites
That Things Must Change
One of my only genuine quibbles with Professor Rock’s incisive essay is his

sourcing of the current debate over the purpose of corporations in our society to
late-arising symptoms of long-simmering discontent. To trace this debate to
statements by the head of a huge money management firm and the Business
Roundtable38 is like tracing the American Revolution to Cornwallis’s surrender and
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Rock, supra note 1, at 2 (tracing the current debate to statements by Larry Fink, the head of the investment
management firm BlackRock, and the Business Roundtable, in 2018 and 2019 respectively).
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the ceding of the colonies by George III. In fact, John Adams said it was a mistake
to say the American Revolution started even at the much earlier skirmish at
Lexington and Concord, tracing it to the prior acts of civil resistance that preceded
the start of formal warfare.39 When representatives of the very business elites who
have been the winners of the redistribution signal their recognition from the
working many to the “haves” that our corporate governance system is broken, that
is not the start of something; it is the signal that the simmer is threatening to boil
over. Before an establishment gets burned, its wiser and more enlightened leaders
often speak up to push for a rebalancing that largely preserves the existing order
and ameliorates the conditions that have given rise to widespread discontent. In
my view, that is what the statements of the Business Roundtable and money
managers like BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard signal: a recognition that an
economic system that is so skewed toward the few will not continue to be tolerated
by the many.
As a matter of fair attribution, I would have liked to see Professor Rock
credit not these late-arriving elites, but rather the many activists and scholars who
came to this view and acted on it before it was popular to do so. Within the
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From John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, 13 February 1818, FOUNDERS ONLINE, NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6854 (“The Revolution was effected before the War
commenced. The Revolution was in the Minds and Hearts of the People. A Change in their Religious Sentiments of
their Duties and Obligations.”).
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corporate law academy, scholars who worried about the skewed outcomes
produced by our corporate governance system for working people and our
environment never got as much attention as those who pushed for tearing down
takeover defenses and making it easier for activist investors to influence company
policies, and to tie CEO pay to total stock returns. This stockholder-focused
scholarship was not without contention, but it primarily centered on the question of
whether corporate governance changes would have the effect of increasing stock
prices (or some proxy for it like Tobin’s Q)—the blinkered metric that many
corporate law academics took to be the correct measure, often without thinking
deeply about it.40 As Professor Rock himself points out, this narrow prism was
often justified by the idea that other bodies of law took care of matters like the fair
treatment of workers or even creditors, consumer safety, and the protection of our
environment. Plus, positive law could theoretically even out the portions of the
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The debate between Rob Daines and Guhan Subramanian illustrates this. Compare Robert Daines, Does
Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001) (presenting evidence that Delaware corporate law
improves firm value), with Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization 32–59 (Harvard Olin Ctr. L., Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 391, 2002), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
345040 (refining Daines’s methodology and presenting evidence that his identified trend did not continue after
1996). Another example is the various debates between Lucian Bebchuk, on the one hand, and those more skeptical
of takeovers and activism on the other. Compare Bebchuk & Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, supra note
26 (finding that staggered boards are associated with lower firm value), and Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates,
IV, & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy,
54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002) (same), with Steven M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 55
STAN. L. REV. 791, 817–18 (responding to Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, and arguing that their “shareholder
primacy [model] is both normatively and positively inferior to the director primacy model”), and Martijn Cremers,
Lubomir P. Litov, & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and Long-Term Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422
(2017) (finding that staggered boards can be positive for firm value), and Richard H. Koppes, Lyle G. Ganske &
Charles T. Haag, Corporate Governance Out of Focus: The Debate Over Classified Boards, 54 BUS. LAW. 1023,
1025–26 (1998) (arguing that staggered boards “best serve the interests of shareholders and management in many
situations”).
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economic pie by redistributive taxing and spending policies.41 Corporate law itself
could just focus on the more burning question of whether the rules of corporate
governance were optimally designed to increase stock prices. Indeed, even a herd
of elite law and economics scholars obsessed with agency costs largely ignored
that most Americans were now stockholders of money managers, not companies
themselves, and that these money managers had huge agency problems that made it
difficult to align their actions with that of their diversified human investors. The
predominant strain was just on squeezing corporate management to get more juice
to the stockholders,42 with pushback from a few traditionalist scholars who argued
that there was long-term value to stockholders in a more managerialist model that
reduces some of the short-term pressures of the market.43 Scholars who worried
about other stakeholders were largely lumped into a general category of corporate
social responsibility and not taken very seriously by those predominating at the
elite law schools.

41

I say theoretically for two important reasons. First, because of the influence of corporate and business elites on
our political process, the likelihood of this happening has been rendered minuscule. Second, my sense is that the
scholars most likely to point to redistribution by government, rather than the need to make corporations pay fair
wages, are the least likely as a class to support the taxing and spending policies that would be necessary to achieve
anything like fairness.
42

A primary means of doing so was making companies more susceptible to immediate market whims, through
successful efforts to get rid of classified boards, turn decisions to withhold a proxy into a “no” vote that can unseat a
director, and to have annual “say on pay” votes even though no rational person believes executive pay should be set
on a year to year basis.
43

See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 86
(2019) (arguing that director discretion best advances stockholder wealth).
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Is this overstated? If so, I would say not by much. But equity requires
tipping a hat to scholars and commentators who kept an eye on the bigger picture
consequences of corporate governance. That people like David Millon, Lyman
Johnson, William Lazonick, Harold Meyerson, Thomas Geoghegan, Robert
Kuttner, Brett McDonnell, Kent Greenfield, and Marleen O’Connor44 were not
given the prominence of scholars like Lucian Bebchuk and Michael Jensen does
not mean there was no debate.45 Rather, it means that what corporate law and
finance elites mistook for the debate was but a narrow slice of it.46 At best, it
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The list could go on, and include names like Damon Silvers, Stephen Pearlstein, John Coates, Larry Mitchell, and
Bill Bratton—as well as emerging voices interested in the larger subject of corporate governance’s effect on society,
like David Webber, Matthew Bodie, Elizabeth Pollman, Lynne Paine, Rebecca Henderson, Ewan McGaughey,
Lenore Palladino, Zeynep Ton, Dalia Tsuk, David Yosifon, Rick Alexander, Chris Brummer, Lisa Fairfax, and
Grant M. Hayden. I am sure I have omitted many. My point is that because these and other folks were interested
and shone a light on how unequal the outcomes in our corporate governance system are, they helped bring about the
eventual recognition by business elites that things needed to change.
45

Even law and economics titans like Larry Summers questioned, for example, whether corporate takeovers were
good for society, rather than just for stockholders. See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in
Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan. J. Auerbauch ed., 1988)
(discussing negative effects of takeovers on workers). In fact, after some distancing from that position, Professor
Summers has returned strongly to the view that increasing the power of the stock market over companies, and
decreasing the voice of workers, has had profoundly negative effects on our society. See Anna Stansbury &
Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the
American Economy (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27193, 2020),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193.
46

Admittedly, the effects of our corporate governance system on workers has long been a preoccupation of my own.
In 2007, a symposium issue of the Journal of Corporate Law addressed an article of mine, and had contributions
from important thinkers ranging from Steve Bainbridge on the right, to Damon Silvers and Richard Ferlauto on the
left, with important centrist corporate governance thinkers like Jack Bogle, Martin Lipton, Larry Hamermesh, Paul
Rowe, John Olson, and Ron Gilson, all dilating on larger questions than were characteristic of that decade’s debate.
See 33 J. Corp. L. (2007); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? The Shared Interests of
Managers and Labor in a More Rational Corporate Governance System, 33 J. CORP. L. 1 (2007); see also Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications of Globalization for the Effective
Regulation of Corporate Behaviour, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 241 (2008); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Securing Our Nation’s
Economic Future: A Sensible, Nonpartisan Agenda to Increase Long-Term Investment and Job Creation in the
United States, 71 BUS. LAW. 1081 (2016).

31

meant grudgingly addressing Margaret Blair and the late Lynn Stout and their
defense of director discretion as a better way for corporations to function and the
argument that we should encourage not just fair treatment of, but increased firmspecific investments in, workers and communities;47 and of course it meant
aggressively taking on Marty Lipton’s long-standing defense of allowing directors
room to embrace stakeholder governance. This slice of the debate, however, rarely
addressed the larger questions raised by some scholars about the effect corporate
governance was having on inequality and the environment.48 Outside corporate
law academia and in the policy realm, the same limited prism dominated for much
of the period since the 1980s. Much more time was spent on tearing down
defenses to acquisitions and activism, and on tying CEO pay to stock performance,
than on whether corporate boards were treating workers fairly, being
environmentally responsible, or even prudently managing corporate risk.49

47

See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247
(1999) (arguing that the team production model justifies director discretion, allowing and encouraging firm-specific
investments of all members of the corporation, including rank and file employees).
48

For an example of high-quality scholarship of this stockholder-focused kind, see, e.g., Bebchuk, Coates, &
Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards, supra note 40 (arguing that staggered boards
are bad for stockholders). Their article generated responses from other scholars trying to show the contrary.
E.g., Mark Gordon, Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 819 (2002) (responding
to Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, and arguing that tools such as use of a staggered board are important in
balancing the bargaining power of acquirers and targets); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease
Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 845, 856–57 (2002) (responding to
Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, and questioning whether the use of staggered boards is bad for stockholders
given ex ante benefits); Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 40, at 817–18 (arguing
that director primacy rather than shareholder primacy is normatively and positively better).
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Leo E. Strine, One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for
the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1 (2010) (showing
that even after the manage-to-the-market-driven debacles leading to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, institutional
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But there were some in the vanguard who had their eye on the ball. The
Aspen Business and Society program, founded and directed by Judy Samuelson,
has consistently focused on the bigger picture question of how corporations affect
society, and what can be done to create a corporate governance system that
produces more socially productive outcomes.50 And increasingly those in this
camp began to recognize that making corporations more socially responsible
required making the institutional investors who now controlled them live up to
their responsibilities and embrace a more enlightened form of stewardship, one
focused on fostering sustainable growth and the fair treatment of the workers
whose capital they increasingly held. And the founders of the nonprofit
organization B Lab created a new form of corporation, the Benefit Corporation (“B
Corps”), specifically designed to encourage corporations to serve a positive social
purpose, to avoid externalities that harmed society, and to govern themselves in a

investors used their influence to push for more manage-to-the-market policies, such as reducing takeover defenses,
votes on executive pay, and so-called “majority voting” to turn withhold votes into votes to unseat directors, and did
not push for initiative to improve risk management and compliance).
50

THE ASPEN INST., TOWARD A NEW CAPITALISM: THE PROMISE OF OPPORTUNITY AND THE FUTURE OF WORK (Jan.
12, 2017), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/the-promise-of-opportunity-and-the-future-of-work/; THE
ASPEN INST., AMERICAN PROSPERITY PROJECT: A NONPARTISAN FRAMEWORK FOR LONG-TERM INVESTMENT (Dec.
19, 2016), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/the-american-prosperity-project-policy-framework/; THE
ASPEN INST., LONG-TERM VALUE CREATION: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS (June 15,
2010), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/long-term-value-creation-guiding-principles-for-corporationsand-investors/; THE ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO
INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (Sept. 16, 2009), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/
overcoming-short-termism-call-more-responsible-approach-investment-business-management/; JUDY SAMUELSON,
Chapter 4, in THE SIX NEW RULES OF BUSINESS: CREATING REAL VALUE IN A CHANGING WORLD (Berrett-Koehler,
2021).

33

manner that was fair to all stakeholders.51 Not only that, but they fueled a statutory
movement to get the model passed in 38 states, including the market leader,
Delaware.52 In short, long before the Business Roundtable, BlackRock, or other
late-arriving yet well-meaning organizations affiliated with business elites that are
cited by Professor Rock arrived on the scene, there were those deeply concerned
that our corporate governance system was tilting far too much toward the “haves”
at the expense of the many.
In tracing the current dynamic to very recent statements by powerful wealthy
interests, Professor Rock also slights a discussion of the important reasons why
there has been so much growing societal interest in corporate governance reform.
In this reply, I cannot do justice to those causes, but a few are worth underscoring.
A.

Bailing Out Those Who Caused the Need for the Bailout

The evidence is undisputed that the financial sector of our economy has been
a huge winner in recent generations. But it is also hard to dispute that its wins
have not been associated with corresponding gains for society as a whole, but
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ABOUT B LAB, https://bcorporation.net/. The founders of B Lab were Jay Coen Gilbert, Bart Houlahan, and
Andrew Kassoy. Jay Coen Gilbert, Bart Houlahan, and Andrew Kassoy – B-Lab Founders, CONSCIOUS
CAPITALISM, https://www.consciouscapitalism.org/heroes/b-lab-founders.
52

WHY PASS BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION, BENEFIT CORPORATION, https://benefitcorp.net/policymakers
/why-pass-benefit-corporation-legislation (“38 states including the District of Columbia have passed benefit
corporation legislation.”); 8 Del. C. § 361; see also Frederick Alexander et al., From Shareholder Primacy to
Stakeholder Capitalism, B LAB & THE S’HOLDER COMMONS (Sept. 7, 2020) (“As B Corps have been successful in
both public and private markets, over 10,000 businesses have followed suit by becoming benefit corporations. Over
the last decade, these pioneers were enabled by our nonpartisan initiative that passed benefit corporation statutes in
38 states, always with bipartisan support.”).
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rather with an increasing concentration of wealth at the top, and greater wage
stagnation and inequality for the rest. Just as importantly, this financialization of
the economy has been a cause of greater instability, leverage, and risk. Sound
businesses were acquired and levered up unsustainably, resulting in firm failures
and layoffs. Risky financial gamesmanship and fraud caused the demise of others.
Imprudent lending practices fueled by the securitization casino proliferated. This
has repeatedly resulted in the American taxpayer coming to the rescue, with a
recovery plan that has to date always put the financial sector, that which could
fairly be said to have caused the crisis, at the front of the line in the response. This
series of bailouts—in 1987 after the Wall Street crash;53 in the 1990s to address the
savings and loans crisis;54 in 2001 and 2002 during the recession identified with
Enron and WorldCom;55 and of course in 2008 and 2009 after the financial crisis

53

STOCK MARKET CRASH OF 1987, FED. RES., https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/stock-market-crash-of1987 (documenting how the Federal Reserve served as a source of liquidity to support the financial system after the
1987 stock market crash); Robert T. Parry, The October ’87 Crash Ten Years Later, FED. RES. BANK OF SAN
FRANCISCO (Oct. 31, 1997) (documenting how the Federal Reserve responded to the 1987 crash, including by
performing lender-of-last-resort activity and adding substantially to reserves through open market operations);
Ken Phillips, The Bailout Bubble, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 28, 1997), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1997-dec28-op-2830-story.html (“Bailouts for U.S. investors took other forms as well. After the stock market crashed in
1987, the Federal Reserve pumped out money—liquidity, in red-suspender parlance—to get the indexes back up.
Some traders contend that the Fed also bought futures contracts.”).
54

Richard W. Stevenson, G.A.O. Puts Cost of S.& L. Bailout at Half a Trillion Dollars, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 1996),
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/13/business/gao-puts-cost-of-s-l-bailout-at-half-a-trillion-dollars.html (reporting
that the General Accounting Office estimated the final cost of the savings and loan bailout at $480.9 billion).
55

Luka Nikolic, A Tale of Two Bubbles: How the Fed Crashed the Tech and the Housing Markets, F. ECON. EDUC.
(Aug. 10, 2019), https://fee.org/articles/a-tale-of-two-bubbles-how-the-fed-crashed-the-tech-and-the-housingmarkets/ (“As a response to these two economic shocks, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan decided to cut
rates to one percent starting in 2001 in order to stimulate the economy. This expansionary policy was Greenspan’s
weapon of choice, as he had been praised in the past for saving the United States from several crises by using the

35

that caused the Great Recession56—has involved huge infusions of cash to the
financial sector, who get to factor it for profit in doling out indirectly the stimulus
and relief needed by the many harmed by the irresponsibility. The grossly
inequitable outcomes following these debacles, in which the larger public
experienced economic insecurity, losses of employment, and a growing gap
between themselves and the financiers and corporate managers at the top,
increased public cynicism, caused understandable discontent, and led many to
question the idea that markets were fair and well designed to price and therefore
address excessive risk. The continued focus of institutional investors on making
public companies more and more subject to immediate market whims, inflating the
pay of CEOs to compensate them for managing ruthlessly to increase total stock
return, and facilitating hedge fund activism, inversions to tax havens, and going
private, rather than on risk management and prudence, compounded these
concerns. We shall see whether the imbalanced pandemic recovery efforts that

same policy. After 11 federal funds rate cuts, the federal funds rate was one percent from June 2003 to June
2004.”).
56

See BAILOUT TRACKER, PROPUBLICA (last updated Nov. 9, 2020), https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/ (tracking
the $700 billion-plus bailout to rescue the financial system during the Great Recession); Deborah Lucas, Measuring
the Costs of Bailouts, 11 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 85 (Feb. 2019) (estimating the direct cost of the bailouts associated
with the 2008 financial crisis as being around $500 billion, with the largest direct beneficiaries being the unsecured
creditors of financial institutions); Louise Story & Eric Dash, Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During Bailouts,
N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/business/31pay.html (reporting on the billions
recipients of the government bailout spent on bonuses for high-level executives).
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have taken a markedly Wall Street and stockholder-first approach further turns up
the heat on policy makers for change.
B.

Perhaps Crime Does Pay, If It Is Done by Corporations

The huge costs to society and danger to the future of humanity caused by
other forms of corporate overreaching has also increased the demand for changes
to corporate governance itself. The most high profile of the issues, and the one that
has played the biggest role in fueling demands for investors and companies to
change their behavior, has been around climate change. The fact that many
segments of corporate America, particularly in the energy space, used corporate
resources to obscure the realities of the harm being caused by human-driven
carbon emissions, to deter action at a time when it would have been easier to
address the harm, and to put immediate profits over the future of humanity angered
many.57 It eventually rung bells among the “haves” who realized that an economic
system that was so focused on the short term that it could harm our planet,
endanger our species, and destroy many others was unsustainable and dangerous.
But, climate change is just one example. The opioid addiction crisis that has
harmed millions was caused in large part by corporations putting profit over
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For a timeline of these energy industry efforts at concealment and confusion, see Tweet the Story of the Fossil
Fuel Industry’s Climate Deception, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/
resources/tweet-story-fossil-fuel-industry’s-climate –deception.
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morals in the most basic sense.58 Other scandals in the banking industry centered
on the exploitation of vulnerable clients, particularly those with limited means, by
selling them products and services they did not need, and in some cases did not
even know they were paying for.59 Yet, while American prisons are filled with
poor and especially black people who have committed economic crimes,60 the
incarceration of corporate leaders who cause such widespread harm by intentional
acts of deceit and overreaching were rare.61 And when human beings who are not
corporate leaders commit crimes, no one worries whether their business continues
apace while they are in prison, or what that economic impact might be. But when
corporations commit crimes, they (and hence their investors) do not suffer the kind
of devastating economic harm that individuals often do.62 Rather, corporations just
58

See, e.g., Geoff Mulvihill, OxyContin Maker Purdue Pharma Pleads Guilty in Criminal Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Nov. 24, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/purdue-pharma-opioid-crisis-guilty-plea5704ad896e964222a011f053949e0cc0 (“Purdue Pharma pleaded guilty [] to three criminal charges, formally taking
responsibility for its part in an opioid epidemic that has contributed to hundreds of thousands of deaths.”).
59

An iconic American financial institution, Wells Fargo, has come to exemplify this issue. Brian Tayan, The Wells
Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/06/the-wells-fargo-cross-selling-scandal-2/.
Karen Dolan, The Poor Get Prison: The Alarming Spread of the Criminalization of Poverty, INST. POL’Y STUD.
(Mar. 18, 2015), https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/IPS-The-Poor-Get-Prison-Final.pdf (“Poor people,
especially people of color, face a far greater risk of being fined, arrested, and even incarcerated for minor offenses
than other Americans. A broken taillight, an unpaid parking ticket, a minor drug offense, sitting on a sidewalk, or
sleeping in a park can all result in jail time.”).
60

61

The reader interested in the subject of whether corporate law has been enforced as vigorously as it should have
been in recent decades should see JENNIFER TRAUB, BIG DIRTY MONEY: THE SHOCKING INJUSTICE AND UNSEEN
COSTS OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME (Viking 2017); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., CORPORATE CRIME & PUNISHMENT: THE
CRISIS OF UNDERENFORCEMENT (Barrett-Koehler 2020).
62

Terry-Ann Craigie et al, Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings: How Involvement with the Criminal
Justice System Deepens Inequality, BRENNAN CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y ADVOC. (SEPT. 15, 2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/conviction-imprisonment-and-lost-earnings-howinvolvement-criminal (“[T]hose who spend time in prison miss out on more than half the future income they might
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proceed under new, or sometimes even the same, management, after paying fines
that many of them regard as just the price of doing business.
C.

More Pie for the Few, Crumbs for the Many

Perhaps no factor has driven demand for change more than the profound
shift in gainsharing that has characterized American corporate governance during
the last 40 years.63 Sure, we all wish that the overall pie would have grown more,
but we aren’t inventing new products as transformational as the automobile and
refrigerator now.64 But plenty of new pie was baked. What changed the most was
not growth, but how the spoils of improved productivity and profitability were
distributed. Consistent with the power dynamics of a corporate governance and

otherwise have earned. . . . As a perpetual drag on the earning potential of tens of millions of Americans, these costs
are not only borne by individuals, their families, and their communities. They are also system-wide drivers of
inequality and are so large as to have macroeconomic consequences.”); Matthew Menendez & Lauren-Brooke Eisen,
The Steep Costs of Criminal Justice Fees and Fines, BRENNAN CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y ADVOC. (Nov. 21, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/steep-costs-criminal-justice-fees-and-fines (“[C]riminal
justice debt represents a significant barrier to a person’s chances of successfully reentering society following a
conviction. It also hurts the families of those who are incarcerated, depriving them of a wage earner while adding
new court costs to the defendant’s criminal debts.”).
63

For excellent literature on this and showing that inequality and wage stagnation has grown enormously in the
period since the Reagan Administration, see Emanuel Saez & Gabriel Zachman, Wealth Inequality in the U.S. Since
1913: Evidence From the Capitalized Income Tax Data (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20625,
2014), https://perma.cc/E77Y-B54u; Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts, ECON. POL. INST., https://www.epi.org/
publication/charting-wage-stagnation/; Chad Stone et al, A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income
Equality, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1128011pov._0.pdf.; Katherine Schaefer, 6 Facts About Economic Inequality in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 7,
2020), https://www.pew research.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/6-facts-about-economic-inequality-in-the-us/; Drew
DeSilver, For Most U.S. Workers, Real Wages Have Barely Budged in Decades, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://WS.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-workers-real-wages-have-barelybudged-for-decades/.
For example, real median household income has only grown by 22 percent since 1984, while the top 1%’s income
has grown by 180%. Saez & Zachman, supra, at tbl. 2.
64

See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE
CIVIL WAR (Princeton Univ. Press 2017) (describing how the rate of growth since 1970 has declined because the
life-altering scale of innovations between 1870 and 1970 cannot be repeated).
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political system skewed toward the powerful and against other stakeholders, the
share for top management, stockholders, and money managers went way up, while
the share for workers below top management went way down.65 The distributional
impact of this shift was profound because the stockholder class, even today,
remains unrepresentative of the general American public and is comparatively
much better off.66 Shifting a large portion of what had formerly gone into worker’s
pay caused much greater economic insecurity and inequality, and it particularly
hurt black Americans—in their first half-century of anything remotely resembling
free participation in the labor market—who are much more likely to be in the

The data shows that largely up until the Reagan Administration reversed our nation’s commitment to the New
Deal, equality in the United States was rising, including for Black Americans, and wage increases for workers were
more closely correlated with increases in corporate profits, CEO pay, and stock prices. Since that period, there has
been a huge decline in the share of capitalist gains in worker pay, while there have been seismic increases in the
return to stockholders and top managers. See generally The Productivity—Pay Gap, ECON. POL’Y INST. (July 2019),
https://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap/ (“From 1979 to 2018, net productivity rose 69.6 percent, while the hourly
pay of typical workers essentially stagnated—increasing only 11.6 percent over 39 years (after adjusting for
inflation).”).
65

To cite only one of many stark examples, American productivity grew 69.6 percent from 1979 to 2018, while CEO
compensation grew by 940%, and the S&P 500 grew by 2400%. For U.S. workers? A total increase of 11.6%. Id.;
see also William Lazonick, The Financialization of the US Corporation: What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be
Regained, 36 SEATTLE L. REV. 857, 857–60 (2013) (describing how inequality declined during the post-World War
II era, and then increased markedly since the 1980s).
Robin Wigglesworth, How America’s 1% Came to Dominate Stock Ownership: Market’s Tenfold Gain Since
1990 Has Mostly Gone to the Richest Part of the Population, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020), https://financial
post.com/investing/how-americas-1-came-to-dominate-stock-ownership (citing statistics that the top 1% own 56%
of stocks, that the remainder of the top 10% own most of the rest, and that the 90% of Americans below the top 10%
only own 12% of the stock, and noting that the trends toward the top have accelerated in recent decades); see also B.
Ravikumar, How Has Stock Ownership Trended in the Past Few Decades, ST. LOUIS FED (April 9, 2018),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/april/stock-ownership-trended-past-few-decades (demonstrating
the trend toward greater inequality, with the top decile owning the overwhelming bulk of stock).
66

For an excellent overall summary of just how unequal income and wealth is distributed in the United States, see G.
William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, WHO RULES AMERICA?, https://whorulesamerica.ucsc.edu/power/
wealth.html.

40

working and lower middle class.67 Many elites sloughed off the growing
inequality as solely the result of globalization, or as only involving uneducated
workers. But that ignored the reality that the decline in gainshifting was much
greater in the United States;68 involved how gains were distributed rather than

67

See Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, supra note 66, at 7 (showing that the income gap disfavoring black
people is growing, that they are far behind white people, and that the wealth gap in favor of white people in 2013
was over 200 to 1 when home equity was excluded); Kim Parker & Richard Fry, More Than Half of U.S.
Households Have Some Investments in the Stock Market, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/03/25/more-than-half-of-u-s-households-have-some-investment-in-thestock-market/ (showing median stockholdings of black Americans at one-fifth that of white Americans); Kristin
McIntosh et al, Examining the Black-White Wealth Gap, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/up-front/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-white-wealth-gap/ (showing the huge wealth
and income gap disfavoring black Americans and demonstrating that it is growing); David Leonhardt, The BlackWhite Wage Gap Is As Big As It Was in the 1950s, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
06/25/opinion/sunday/race-wage-gap.html (documenting that racial wealth and income gap shrunk in the post-war
era, citing scholars attributing this to rising wages due to strong unions, the inclusion of formerly excluded jobs that
many black workers held in the minimum wage by Great Society legislation in 1966, and other policies that
benefited all working people, but that these gains then reversed from the 1980s forward). See generally Facts:
Racial Economic Inequality, INEQUALITY.ORG, https://inequality.org/facts/racial-inequality/ (comprehensively
documenting racial inequality, including that the median black family had net wealth of only $3,500 compared to
white median family wealth of $147,000, and that this trend has grown considerably since the early 1980s; showing
that of the Fortune 500 CEOs just 14 were Black or Latino, whereas Black and Latinos would comprise 44.1% of
the workers who would benefit from increasing the federal minimum wage; and that top 10% of Black families earn
only around $60,000 compared to $117,986 for white families; and that white workers made 28% more than the
typical Black worker).
For an excellent article discussing profound racial inequality and situating it within the current pandemic, see Elise
Gould & Valerie Wilson, Black Workers Face Two of the Most Lethal Preexisting Conditions for Coronavirus—
Racism and Inequality, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 1, 2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/black-workers-covid/.
For an article connecting corporate governance with racial inequality, see Eleanor Bloxham & Bruce F. Freed, It’s
Time for Boards and Institutional Investors to Act on Racial Justice, BARRON’S (June 19, 2020),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/its-time-for-boards-and-institutional-investors-to-act-on-racial-justice51592527239 (describing the role of large institutional investors in enabling racial justice by opposing corporate
political disclosure resolutions, which enabled companies to quietly donate to Republicans and help flip state
legislatures and elect governors who opposed legislation or programs that would address inequality and racial justice
issues).
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Domhoff, supra note 66, at 11, 17 (showing that U.S. income inequality now far exceeds that of its major market
economy allies—including Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom—and that there is a similar trend in wealth
concentration); Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An
Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
27193, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193 (demonstrating how much of greater inequality in the United
States can be attributed to the change in power dynamics within corporate governance, with worker power going
down and stock market and institutional investor power increasing).
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whether American companies were competitive; that the American workforce was
more educated and capable of adaptation than ever before;69 and that many highly
educated and skilled workers suffered from wage stagnation. This declining share
for workers not only hurt Black workers, it also hit many white workers and
opened the door for divisive appeals (in varying degrees of subtlety) blaming the
fate of struggling white workers on people of color and immigrants, and pitting
workers against each other.
For more constructive observers, the declining share represented a failure to
remember the lessons of history and a return to economic policies that had led to
the Great Depression and the rise of Communism and Fascism.70 These observers
wanted a restoration of the New Deal/European Social Democratic model in which
market economies function more equitably, and to adapt that model to meet the
challenges of the concentrated financial power existing in the 21st Century.71
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For a comprehensive examination of why wage stagnation occurred and a refutation of the idea that it was due to a
decline in the education and skills of the U.S. workforce, especially given stagnation in wages among collegeeducated middle managers, see generally William Lazonick, Labor in the 21st Century: The Top 0.1% and the
Disappearing Middle-Class (Inst. For New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 4, 2105), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2586239.
70

The economic programs proposed by both President-elect Biden and his leading primary opponent, Senator
Bernie Sanders, were both grounded on this viewpoint, with the president-elect hewing more strictly to the
American example set by the New Deal and Great Society, while Senator Sanders more openly embraced lessons
from our EU social democratic allies. See ECONOMIC RECOVERY, BIDEN-HARRIS TRANSITION,
https://buildbackbetter.gov/priorities/economic-recovery/ (seeking to create millions of new good-paying union jobs
and to mobilize the economy with an infrastructure plan); BERNIE SANDERS ON THE ISSUES, BERNIESANDERS.COM,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/ (proposing, for example, doubling union membership, eliminating “Right to Work
for Less” laws, enacting a federal jobs guarantee, and creating millions of healthcare and New Green Deal jobs).
71

For a variety of views aligned with this perspective, see A New Deal For This New Century: Making Our
Economy Work for All, NYU L. INST. CORP. GOV. & FIN. (Oct. 3–4, 2019), https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/icgf/
events/new-deal-new-century; Economic Policy Conference, NYU L. INST. CORP. GOV. & FIN. (Oct. 1, 2020),
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D.

The Corporate Power Ratchet: How Corporate Influence Has
Made Externality Regulation Less Effective and Less Realistic

Now, the final causal factor is one that Professor Rock eludes to, but largely
by asking the question: why not just pass laws and adopt regulations to protect
workers, consumers, the environment, and society generally from excessive
corporate greed? He adverts briefly to the frustration that has been felt by the
inability of our society to sustain the New Deal/Great Society consensus and to
ensure that our economy works in a balanced way that helps the many. 72 But he
ends his article on a conservative note, fearing that the demands for change within
corporate governance itself threaten more harm than they promise good.73 In
describing the factors leading to where we now are, Professor Rock highlights
Milton Friedman and his belief that corporations should focus exclusively on
making profits within the rules of the game.74
But what Professor Rock does not discuss is that Milton Friedman and his
acolytes have also engaged in a relentless campaign to eviscerate the rules of the
game that protect workers and other corporate stakeholders. Their inculcation of

https://its.law.nyu.edu/eventcalendar/index.cfm?fuseaction=main.detail&id=78618. Neither of these conferences
would have occurred but for the leadership of the NYU Law Institute for Corporate Governance and Finance that
Professor Rock heads.
72

Rock, supra note 1, at 5–6.

73

Id. at 30.

74

Id. at 26–27.
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their belief system into generations of corporate leaders has led to corporations
using their vast resources to distort our political process.75 The name Lewis Powell
is not cited by Professor Rock, but Powell, more famous as a justice of the
Supreme Court, inspired “praxis” by corporate America to fill out Friedman’s
vision.76 In his capacity as an advisor to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Powell
called on the American business community to rise up against the regulatory state
and to use all their resources to impede it, by lobbying aggressively against
legislation, electing candidates who favored corporate interests, and using the
judiciary as an instrument to get its way.77
During the period when the business community has embraced Powell’s call
to arms, some important laws did get through the legislation gantlet that business
lobbyists and contributors erected to stop important legislation protecting society.
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See Liz Kennedy, Corporate Capture Threatens Democratic Government, CTR. AMERICAN PROGRESS (Mar. 29,
2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/news/2017/03/29/429442/corporate-capture-threatensdemocratic-government/; Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet, supra note 12.
My use of the Marxist term for converting theory into action is a hat tip to Professor Rock’s citation to Vladimir
Lenin and the importance of ideology in affecting behavior. Rock, supra note 1, at 22.
76
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Memorandum from Lewis Powell to the Chairman of the Education Committee of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Attack on American Free Enterprise System (Aug. 23, 1971), https://research.greenpeaceusa.org/?
a=view&d=5971&_ga=2.180401764.2131756745.1607699824-1906142670.1607699824. Powell could never feel
his advice was not taken. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other corporate interests dominate lobbying
expenditures. Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet, supra note 12, at 431–32 n.31 (collecting sources demonstrating
this point); Leo E. Strine, Jr & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course: The Tension Between Conservative
Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 359–62, 387 (2015) (collecting sources
demonstrating how much corporate political spending surged after Citizens United allowed the use of treasury funds
for that purpose); see also Megan R. Wilson, Lobbying’s Top 50: Who’s Spending Big, THE HILL (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://perma.cc/R4Y7-TQSA (showing that 49 of the top 50 spending lobbying interests were business or businessrelated).
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But many of those laws were struck down by an increasingly activist judiciary,
which departed from past precedent to reach out and strike down legislation, such
as McCain–Feingold,78 Medicaid expansion in the Affordable Care Act,79 and the
Voting Rights Act.80 The business community also weaponized the litigation
process to get activist judges to strike down important environmental regulations;81
use the First Amendment to elevate the interests of corporations over protections
for their workers, consumers, and even public safety against firearms;82 and render
hollow the protections of laws like the National Labor Relations Act.83
By exercising their political muscle and expenditures, corporate America
tilted the whole political system to the right, seating federal and state officials who
often sought to undermine the implementation of laws on the books and made it
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Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).

80

Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
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E.g., Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743 (2015); Util. Air Regulatory v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014); Rapanos v.
United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
82

The scholarship of John Coates, Robert Post, and Amanda Shandor documents this well. See John C. Coates, IV,
Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223 (2015);
Robert Post & Amanda Shandor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165 (2015). And, of
course, compare the treatment of corporations in Citizens United with the treatment of labor unions in cases like
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209 (1977). See also Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Jonathan R. Macey, Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law,
2019 WIS. L. REV. 451 (2019) (discussing this issue); Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, supra note
77, at 359–62, 387 (same).
83

For my own comprehensive take on this phenomenon, see Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet, supra note 12. For
discussion of the negative effect of this on the ability of workers to exercise their rights under the NLRA, see Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Development on a Cracked Foundation: How the Incomplete Nature of New Deal Labor Reform
Presaged Its Ultimate Decline: A Response to Cuéllar, Levi, and Weingast, 57 HARV. J. LEG. 67, 83–84 (2020).
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much more difficult to pass new legislation.84 The effects of these integrated
actions were reinforcing, because passing legislation not only got harder, but if the
legislation did go through, the likelihood that it or key implementing regulations
would get struck down by the courts also grew.85
With these corporate power dynamics making external regulation to protect
society and corporate stakeholders much less effective and realistic, it seems to me
natural and not at all surprising that advocates for workers, consumers, and the
environment would begin to demand reforms to corporate law itself. That seems
even more natural when so many Americans were becoming “forced capitalists,”
effectively required by federal mandate to turn over part of their pay every month
to money managers, if they were lucky enough to be paid sufficiently to be able to
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As an important new study by the Center for Political Accountability shows, the amount of spending by public
companies to influence political elections is huge, goes overwhelmingly to Republican candidates and committees,
and has been used to seat candidates who have gerrymandered legislative districts and put in place ballot restrictions
harming black people; opposed action to address climate change; opposed LGBTQ rights; attacked the Affordable
Care Act, including during the pandemic; and sought to restrain women’s reproductive rights. CONFLICTED
CONSEQUENCES, CTR. POL. ACCOUNTABILITY (July 21, 2020), https://politicalaccountability.net/hifi/
files/Conflicted-Consequences.pdf. As the report shows, in many cases the companies donating large amounts to
candidates and committees taking these policy positions were, at the same time, publicly claiming that their
corporate policy was to the contrary. That is, these corporations were saying one thing on issues like racial justice
and climate change, while using their funds to tilt government policy in the opposite direction.
85

In other work, I have explained how the ideology of stockholder primacy encourages corporations to focus their
political spending on supporting candidates and committees that will minimize regulation of corporate externalities.
Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, supra note 77, at 349–50; Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet, supra
note 12, at 442. There is evidence that companies that engage more of such rent-seeking behavior tend to perform
less well than companies that instead focus on making money by developing and selling high-quality products and
services. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate
Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political Spending, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1007, 1034–35 (2020).
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save for retirement.86 Perhaps, these advocates thought, if corporate law itself, and
particularly the power dynamics within it, would change, we can get corporations
themselves to behave more responsibly. Not only would this involve them treating
their stakeholders and society better, it would also specifically involve trying to
limit the extent to which corporations use their influence to prevent the political
process from putting in place effective external regulations. That is, in order to
revitalize external regulation, advocates of a fairer society rationally became
convinced that internal corporate governance reform was required.
V.

Time for 21st Century Corporate Governance for a 21st Century
Economy: A More Optimistic, and Less Fearful, Perspective
Professor Rock ends on a pessimistic note. He fears that instead of focusing

on external laws protecting stockholders, populist pressures will be exerted on
corporate law itself and result in changes that undermine, rather than improve,
social welfare.87
I am more optimistic.88 For starters, one of the most central proposals for
reforming corporate law, the public benefit corporation model, builds on and
Strine, Fiduciary Blind Spot, supra note 85, at 1011, 1020–22 (describing how “the mutual fund industry is
federally subsidized because powerful tax incentives require American workers to become ‘forced capitalists’”).
86
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In this skepticism that corporate law itself has much to offer stakeholders like workers, Professor Rock echoes
well-reasoned arguments from scholars like Steve Bainbridge and Ron Gilson. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in Corporate Governance: A Comment on Strine, 33 J. CORP. L. 21, 24–26
(2007) (explaining reasons he believes corporate law has little potential to help workers in particular); Ronald J.
Gilson, Leo Strine’s Third Way: Responding To Agency Capitalism, 33 J. CORP. L. 47, 54–55 (2007) (arguing that
law external to corporate law, not within corporate law, is what should and can protect workers).
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This does not mean I am correct, of course. In the period running up to the 2016 election, I believed that the
obvious economic insecurity in the nation would lead to pressures for bipartisan action to make our economy fairer,
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strengthens traditional corporate law, rather than turning it upside down. In
particular, the model rests on two important and related factors that other
commentators also tend to slight in addressing the corporate purpose debate. The
first is that part of the genius of American corporate law, if it has any, has been in
determining the conditions under which it is best for the judiciary to keep its hands
off corporate decision-making.89 This is fundamental to the business judgment rule
itself, which provides, as Professor Rock emphasizes, wide discretion for corporate
directors, even in Delaware, to govern the firm in a manner that is respectful of all
stakeholders, so long as in doing so the directors seek to advance the interests of
the stockholders as well.90 The second is that corporate law often seeks to promote
and so did others. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Securing Our Nation’s Economic Future: A Sensible,
Nonpartisan Agenda to Increase Long-Term Investment and Job Creation in the United States, 71 BUS. LAW. 1081
(2016) (discussing a specific agenda to address calls for economic reform); THE ASPEN INST., AMERICAN
PROSPERITY PROJECT: A NONPARTISAN FRAMEWORK FOR LONG-TERM INVESTMENT 5–6 (Dec. 19, 2016),
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2017/01/American-Prosperity-Project_Policy-Framework_FINAL1.3.17.pdf. But only one candidate talked about economic insecurity during that election (albeit in a divisive and
counterproductive way), and what has resulted is four years of inaction, at best, even as there has been an
intensification of the trend toward inequality and unfairness. We shall see what the new election results portend, but
I believe that FDR’s view of fear, expressed in his 1933 inaugural address, is as relevant today. First Inaugural
Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIBRARY, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_
century/froos1.asp (“This is preeminently the time to speak the truth, the whole truth, frankly and boldly. Nor need
we shrink from honestly facing conditions in our country today. This great Nation will endure as it has endured,
will revive and will prosper. So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear
itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance. In
every dark hour of our national life a leadership of frankness and vigor has met with that understanding and support
of the people themselves which is essential to victory.”).
See Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, supra note 43, at 109–29 (arguing that “the
business judgement rule is justified precisely because judicial review threatens the board’s authority,” that judges
are not business experts, and that the BJR encourages risk taking and has positive effects on internal board
dynamics); Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, supra note 47, at 315–16 (arguing that
providing directors wide discretion to act, so long as they are not using their positions to benefit themselves, allows
them the latitude to promote the joint welfare of the corporation).
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Rock, supra note 1, at 20; see also Jonathan Macey, Sublime Myths: An Essay In Honor of the Shareholder Value
Maximization Myth and the Tooth Fairy, 91 TEX. L. REV. 911, 920 (2013) (arguing that the business judgment rule
acts to “eviscerate large swaths of the notion of shareholder value maximization”); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing
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certain conduct by corporate managers by means of encouragement and the
articulation of a normative duty, not by threat of monetary liability. A good
example of this is the duty articulated by the Caremark case in Delaware.91 As a
normative matter, Chancellor Allen’s decision encouraged directors to step up and
be active monitors to ensure that their companies put in place and attended to
systems of reporting and monitoring designed to ensure compliance with law. For
that reason, Caremark is rightly seen as having inspired greater compliance efforts
by corporate America.92 But Chancellor Allen did not expose directors to
negligence-based liability; rather, he immunized them from that and held that they
could only be liable if they acted in bad faith, by failing to even try to exercise
their monitoring duties.93 This discordance between what is expected of directors

Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 NYU L. REV. 733, 770–72 (2005) (arguing to the same effect); LYNN
STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS,
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 32 (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2012) (same).
91

In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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See Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty Year Lookback, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOV.
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/03/29/caremark-and-compliance-a-twenty-year-lookback/
(“In nearly all narratives of how compliance has grown as a legal subject and field of practice in the last two
decades, the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in In re Caremark plays a featured role.”). But see id. (“I join the
lively academic debate over whether Caremark’s causal impact on the unmistakable growth curve of compliance has
been overstated.”); Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone: Directors’ Evolving Duty to
Monitor 4–5, 23–24 (NYU L. Ctr. L., Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 08-57, 2008) (arguing that Caremark was
successful in expanding directors’ oversight duties and incentivizing them to assume active oversight over legal
compliance, but that its success is limited and heavily dependent on the clarity of the law, since bad-faith liability is
narrow).
93

698 A.2d at 972.
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normatively and what they can be held liable for in damages is now, because of the
ubiquity of exculpatory charter clauses, standard in American corporate law.94
In the period during which Milton Friedman wrote his famous essay, both of
these factors could be seen to have had prominence in the purpose debate. At that
time, stockholders were still seen as dispersed and relatively weak, and managers
comparatively powerful. Thus, many on the political right feared that corporate
managers would use their power to advance liberal political values using corporate
funds.95 They worried that the slack that the business judgment rule gave
managers insulated them from accountability to stockholders, that stockholders
would see their invested capital used for political and social purposes that they did
not share, and thus they argued that, within the bounds of the law, corporate
managers should focus on creating profits for stockholders. In other words, they
sought to articulate and inculcate a normative duty of managers that would cause
them to put profit first, and to be reticent to impose their social norms on society
through the exercise of corporate power. The advocates of this world view pressed
their position in not just the political process, but in academia, the business press,
and particularly in forums for management education.
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See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and the Self-Governing
Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001).
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Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, supra note 77 at 352–53.
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As Professor Rock shows, the first factor—the room provided by the
business judgment rule—also played a role in reaction to the takeover wave of the
1980s. The so-called constituency statutes were adopted to give corporate
managers additional room under the business judgment rule to resist takeovers and
to govern in a manner that treated all stakeholders as equal.96 But those statutes are
notable for the extent to which they did not take into account the second factor:
the statutes enabled corporate management to consider stakeholder interests but did
not mandate it. Not only did the statutes generally provide no enforcement
mechanism at all, there was nothing to enforce because the statutes just gave
corporate directors—elected solely by stockholders and subject to removal solely
by them—an option to give consideration to the interests of stakeholders like
employees, communities of operations, and consumers. For those related reasons,
there is little evidence that these statutes helped stakeholders; at most, they seem to
have given corporate managers leverage in takeover disputes to take care of their
own interests.97

96

Rock, supra note 1, at 28.
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Bebchuk, Kastiel, & Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, supra note 18; Julian Velasco, The
Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 463–64 (2006) (explaining that these statutes
have been “rather insignificant” because they are permissive and do not provide any enforcement rights to other
stakeholders); Ronald J. Gilson, Leo Strine’s Third Way: Responding to Agency Capitalism, 33 J. CORP. L. 47, 52
(2007) (briefly explaining why he never believed constituency and antitakeover statutes would protect workers).
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The lessons from these experiences have been both over- and underemphasized, in the debate between what might fairly be called “managerialist
stakeholder advocates” and those favoring stockholder-focused corporate
governance.
The managerialists who advocate stakeholder governance have fetishized the
importance of normative purpose.98 They argue rightly that normative purpose
matters, but act as if a rearticulation of normative purpose alone will rebalance the
American corporate governance system in a way that is fairer to stakeholders. But,
interestingly, those who take this position typically wish to just act as if Delaware
law is something other than it is, and ignore the evidence that constituency statutes
have done nothing substantively to protect workers or communities. Put simply,
those in this camp are, in essence, managerialists who will not go beyond giving
directors the discretion to act with respect toward other stakeholders, within overall
corporate law structures that give power only to stockholders. In fact, these
managerialists will not even use the word “shall” to describe a director’s duty to
other stakeholders, much less indulge the notion of giving stakeholders
enforcement or other rights.
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Until late in her all too brief career, Professor Lynn Stout tended to ignore the power dynamics within American
corporate governance that made normative purpose an inadequate answer to her desire for stakeholder-respecting
governance. But her last major work acknowledged this problem and advanced a bold and novel idea to address
this. See LYNN STOUT, TAMARA BELINFANTI, & SERGIO GRAMITTO, CITIZEN CAPITALISM: HOW A UNIVERSAL
FUND CAN PROVIDE INCOME AND INFLUENCE TO ALL (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2019).
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But stockholder advocates also share this fetish with purpose in itself. In a
21st century in which powerful money managers can and do act quickly to impose
change on public companies, some still fear that corporate managers will have too
much slack to impose their own values on society, at the cost of stockholders, if
corporate law allows boards to treat the best interests of all stakeholders as a
proper end of corporate governance.99 They ignore factors that Professor Rock
does not, which render this fear of untethered management running wild highly
improbable. These include: i) the enormous power and ease of action for
institutional investors; ii) vigorous global and domestic competition; iii) provisions
of corporate law that make it impossible for founders who own large blocks to pay
out dividends to themselves without comparable treatment of other investors; and
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My esteemed friend Lucian Bebchuk continues to harbor this concern, and so do other scholars like Jesse Fried,
Glenn Hubbard, and Mark Roe. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder
Governance, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3544978 (arguing that stakeholder
capitalism could impose substantial costs on shareholders and reduce accountability of corporate leaders); Andrew
Ross Sorkin, A Free Market Manifesto That Changed the World, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/09/11/business/dealbook/milton-friedman-doctrine-social-responsibility-of-business.html; Sanjai Bhagat
& R. Glenn Hubbard, For Whom Should Corporations Be Run?, AEIDEAS (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.aei.org/
economics/for-whom-should-corporations-be-run/ (“Who monitors the stakeholder monitor? It is this concern that
animated Friedman’s 1970 contribution.”). For a standard and succinct expression of this concern, see FRANK
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (Harvard U. 1991) (“[A]
manager who has been told to serve two masters . . . has been freed of both and answerable to none.”).
For other and similar criticisms about stakeholder capitalism, see Steve Kaplan, The Enduring Wisdom of Milton
Friedman, PROMARKET (Sept. 14, 2020), https://promarket.org/2020/09/14/the-enduring-wisdom-of-miltonfriedman/ (“Friedman brings up a vital concern about dividing loyalties in this way. ‘If businessmen are civil
servants rather than the employees of their stockholders, then in a democracy they will sooner or later be chosen by
the public techniques of election and appointment. And long before this occurs, their decision-making power will
have been taken away from them.’”); Eugene F. Fama, Market Forces Already Address ESG Issues and the Issues
Raised by Stakeholder Capitalism, PROMARKET (Sept. 25, 2020), https://promarket.org/2020/09/25/market-forcesesg-issues-stakeholder-capitalism-contracts/ (arguing that contract structures already address ESG concerns).
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iv) the provisions of corporate law that strongly discourage self-dealing.100 In fact,
experience under constituency statutes shows that stockholders have little to fear
from a “may” regime, but stakeholders have nothing to gain from it.101
Professor Rock takes Senator Elizabeth Warren to task a bit for a reason
relevant to this discussion: he properly points out that nothing in the substantive
corporate law of Delaware changed during the period in which she rightly argues
that our corporate governance system has swung strongly toward stockholders and
against workers and other stakeholders.102 But, in doing so, he slights something
his own scholarship takes seriously, which is that directors’ normative views of
what their duty is matters. Senator Warren’s quoted statement does fairly address
a profound change in attitude by many CEOs over those of prior generations. And
that attitude had a self-justifying effect, as Chicago-school academics argued that if
CEOs managed to drive so-called “shareholder value” they were best serving
society.
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As to the last point, commentators often ignore that workers, creditors, and communities stand to lose more than
diversified investors if corporate management self-deal or fail to pursue a profitable business strategy. On most
issues of checking managerial conflicts of interest, stakeholders are more, not less, interested than diversified
stockholders in ensuring managerial fidelity to corporate success, rather than personal enrichment, be it financial or
on some other dimension.
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E.g., Bebchuk, Kastiel, & Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, supra note 18 (showing that top
corporate managers did not use constituency statutes to protect employees or communities of operation, but did use
the leverage to benefit stockholders and themselves); Jonathan M. Karpoff & Michael D. Wittry, Institution and
Legal Context in Natural Experiments: The Case of State Antitakeover Laws, 73 J. FIN. 657 (2018) (finding no
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Even more importantly, Senator Warren’s solutions to the problems she
identifies reflect her deeper recognition that the legal architecture of corporate law
has not kept up with market developments that have made institutional investors
and corporate interests much more powerful, and weakened workers and other
corporate stakeholders. Whether one agrees with Senator Warren or not, it is
undeniable that she has identified policy solutions that take into account the way
corporate law actually works.
For the moment, just focus on her support of the public benefit corporation
(“PBC”) model. The PBC model builds on the business judgment rule model by
protecting the board from a challenge to a decision that it makes that requires it to
balance the interests of various stakeholders, including in a sale of the corporation.
By this means, the PBC model puts a brake on the ability of stockholders to use
litigation to put pressure on boards to take actions that harm stakeholders to
generate greater returns for stockholders.
But the PBC model Senator Warren supports also builds on traditional
corporate law techniques by imposing a mandatory, normative duty on directors to
respect all stakeholders. The duty is not optional or discretionary, it is mandatory.
But similar to Caremark, the duty is primarily one that is influential because most
people take duties seriously and try to fulfill them, even if there is no likelihood of
being punished for failing to do so. And like Caremark, most PBC statutes,
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including Delaware’s, create the potential for a suit to enforce the board’s duty to
stakeholders, even if not by means of monetary liability.103 PBC statutes also
require the articulation of a corporate purpose and goals, and the publication of
reports tracking the company’s compliance with its purpose and progress toward
its goals.
Interestingly, the benefit corporation model has critics from both
managerialist stakeholder advocates and from those committed to stockholder-first
governance. For stakeholder advocates of the managerialist camp, they advance
two primary arguments. First, they argue that realists like Professor Rock just
don’t recognize that Delaware law is just like laws in the 33 states that took
express statutory action to be different than Delaware.104 That is, they engage in
wish fulfillment and denial of objective legal reality. Second, and more quietly but
undeniably, these stakeholder advocates are in fact managerialists who do not
support requiring corporate directors to govern in a manner that respects
stakeholders, even if that requirement does not expose the directors to any threat of
monetary liability. These managerialists are stuck at “may,” and wish to give

8 Del. C. § 367 (providing for suits for injunctive and declaratory relief only to enforce directors’ duties to
stakeholders); id. § 102(b)(7) (allowing corporations to limit the personal liability of directors in certain suits).
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Bebchuk, Kastiel, & Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, supra note 18 (finding 33 states with
constituency statutes in force during the period from 2000 to 2019).
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boards and CEOs (subject solely to stockholder power) the discretion to protect
stakeholders to the extent they choose and are able to do so.
Opponents from a stockholder perspective have a more principled basis for
opposition. They believe that boards have no legitimacy to focus on issues other
than making profits within the bounds of law, and they tend to think that, even in
the current era, there is too much slack from the discipline of the stock market.
For someone in the American tradition of evolutionary progress and realism,
both sets of critics may be thought misguided. The managerialists fail to address
the reality that corporate directors are elected by only one constituency, and that
therefore many statutes unaccompanied by more have not worked. The
stockholder advocates ignore that undeniable potency of capital and product
markets and the way they have tilted corporate governance.105 Perhaps most
importantly, the stockholder advocates also ignore that most stockholders are not
long one company, but rather long the entire economy, and thus suffer
economically if externalities are rewarded instead of sustainable wealth creation.
The PBC model evolves American corporate law in a way consistent with its
traditions. Stockholders retain potent protections and the ultimate ability to elect
new directors and to reject transactions they do not like. But the model addresses
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For a balanced view of the potent interaction of activists and institutional investors and their combined power to
hold companies’ feet to the fire, see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge
Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016).
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the profound change in market power developments by building on the business
judgment rule to give directors more space to govern in a way that is fair to other
stakeholders. And it goes further by requiring the directors to in fact do so if they
wish to live up to their legal duties. By both means, it builds on successful
intuitions and approaches taken historically by American corporate law.
The model thus works no fundamental revolution, but is instead a
responsible evolution, insufficient in itself, but useful nonetheless. And its
balanced and incremental nature reduces the fear that Professor Rock expresses in
his pessimistic close that positive change risks more harm than it promises good.
Not only that, most PBC advocates also support action that would greatly
minimize any fear that corporate managers could use their duty toward
stakeholders to impose their own political views on society using corporate
resources. First, within the PBC model itself, the focus is not on politics, it is on a
corporation making profits in a manner that is fair to all stakeholders and that does
no harm to society. Most PBCs have positive purposes connected to their business
model, few if any of which involve hotly contested ideological issues. Second, and
more important, advocates of the PBC model like Senator Warren also support
what a supermajority of Americans do—restricting corporate political spending.106
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See Strine, Fiduciary Blind Spot, supra note 85, at 1023–24 (collecting poll data showing strong and durable
bipartisan support for overturning Citizens United and restricting corporate political spending).
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If corporations were restricted to only making political expenditures under
plans approved by a supermajority of stockholders, as proposed initially by
conservative John Bogle in the wake of Citizens United and included in
progressive Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act,107 the current use of
corporate funds for political purposes would plummet to previous levels, and the
practical ability of managers of public companies to misuse a duty to stakeholders
to pursue their own political hobbyhorses would greatly diminish over what
happens now in corporations operating under Delaware law and “may”
constituency statutes. That is, there would be less danger that stockholders with
diverse views would see their entrusted capital used to fund candidates and causes
they do not agree upon,108 and that are contrary to the interests of diversified
investors.109
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John C. Bogle, The Supreme Court Had Its Say: Now Let Shareholders Decide, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2011),
https://perma.cc/K6YC-K45X; Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 8(b) (2018).
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For important scholarship suggesting that corporate political spending unauthorized by stockholders is likely to
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If corporations were less able to pollute our politics, the ability of corporate
managers to act in illegitimate ways goes way down.110 For example, laws restrict
charities from participating in politics, and most charities as a result address issues
on which there is little societal divide. Even more important, corporate
stakeholders like employees and creditors have even less interest than diversified
investors in letting management pursue hobbyhorses that hurt corporate
performance. Employees need the company to be profitable to have the chance to
keep a job and get raises and promotions. Creditors want to be repaid. Thus,
governance focused on stakeholders is not an authorization for management to do
what it wants, it is a mandate for management to run a profitable company in a way
that respects all stakeholders and benefits, not harms, society. Lastly, the
continued entrustment of the only voting rights to stockholders, and their ability to
throw out management, plus the disciplining effect of product markets, acts as a
powerful check on frolics and detours by managers of public companies.
Interestingly, and relevant to the point of who is being blinkered, is the toonarrow focus of Professor Rock’s last question, which in my view gets the closest
to the heart of the debate. That question asks “what are the social roles and
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As is known, what is known about corporate political spending is outweighed by what is not known, and what is
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about leading organizations devoted to tracking such spending that it is impossible to do so and that much spending
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obligations of large publicly traded firms?”111 But those pushing for genuine
stakeholder-focused corporate governance reform think the question is a broader
one and understand that with developments in the markets, such as the rise of
private equity and the ability to finance huge private companies, addressing the
obligations of public companies is not enough. From just an investor perspective,
many Americans are exposed to the risks of private companies as pensioners, and
as constituents of organizations like universities and charities, because pension
funds and the nonprofit sector invest hundreds of billions of dollars indirectly in
private companies through investment-fund intermediaries. As importantly,
Americans are workers at these companies, live in communities where they operate
and often seek tax subsidies, consume products and services they deliver, and thus
suffer in these capacities if these companies do not fairly treat their workers, their
communities of operation, the environment, their consumers, and their creditors.
In fact, it is these companies that are the least constrained in how they use
corporate resources to act on our political system and in their ability to externalize
costs. The concentrated ownership of their shares largely gets to do what it wants,
and as private companies, they are exempt from reporting to the public even on
their EESG impact.
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Rock, supra note 1, at 1, 6.
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To address these concerns, Senator Warren calls for all companies with over
one billion dollars in revenues112 to become PBCs and to have a duty to all
stakeholders and to avoid causing harm to society.113 Others, including me, believe
it is time that societally important private companies be subject to mandatory
employee, environmental, social, and governance or EESG reporting that would be
focused on how these companies treat their workers, the environments, consumers,
and society, so that they are more accountable on these dimensions and there is not
a perverse incentive to go private to escape the need to report and thus an
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unintentional blinding of us to more information about EESG by requiring public
companies alone to report more information on that subject.
Likewise, there is an increasing recognition that more responsibility needs to
be imposed on institutional investors themselves to set high standards of
stewardship around EESG, and to expect sustainable and ethical business practices
from the companies, private or public, in which they invest.114 Many of these
investors want more track record and EESG information from hedge and private
equity funds and private companies, and public officials are taking an increasing
interest in addressing the outdated public-private divide.115 And there is
corresponding interest in addressing the pressures activists and private equity exert
on our corporate governance system, as a result of “going private” and activist
campaigns that have resulted in harm to workers, creditors, and communities.
Nor are these stakeholder advocates blind to the reality that revitalized
external regulation is essential to restoring a fair American economy. These
advocates are also leading proponents of measures to breathe life back into the

A great citizen of our republic and incisive commentator on corporate governance, Vanguard’s founder, Jack
Bogle, was quicker than many to realize the need for institutional investor responsibility to be at the forefront of any
agenda to make our system of corporate governance function more effectively. John C. Bogle, Reflections on
“Toward Common Sense and Common Ground,” 33 J. CORP. L. 31 (2007).
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The Accountable Capitalism Act, for example, targets all companies with more than one billion dollars in
revenues, and the Brokaw and Stop Wall Street Looting Acts address activism and private equity. Brokaw Act, S.
1744, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing to enhance Rule 13d to require more disclosure by activist investors); Stop
Wall Street Looting Act, S. 3848, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing regulation of private equity to limit ability to take
funds out of portfolio, to impose more exposure to liability to injured stakeholders, and to require more disclosure).
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NLRA116; to pass living wage legislation117; increase consumer protection118;
address climate change; and create jobs and sustainable prosperity by investing in
clean infrastructure and new technologies.119 But they are open-eyed to the related
reality that without addressing corporate power and how it is used, the prospects
for this external regulation being adopted and being allowed to operate are less
robust.120
Of course, some might say, Strine, aren’t you ignoring the call to have
workers elected directors to large company boards?121 Isn’t that a move toward,
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Rock, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that the Accountable Capitalism Act would require that employees elect at least
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well, “socialism.” Well, yes, I do not view the call for that small slice of codetermination as yet central to the debate. Without political conditions allowing
for the passage of labor law reform, living wage, the creation of a mandatory board
committee addressing worker fair pay and safety, and racial and gender equity, and
other legislation that would support a system of board-level co-determination, not
only is that sort of system not likely to pass, it will not function as it should.122
More likely in the immediate term are more realistic moves, as have been
discussed, that have substantial bipartisan appeal and that are more evolutionary.
But, I won’t blanch at addressing the socialist issue. No serious person would
equate European Social Democratic nations like Germany and Sweden that have
co-determination with communism, or a system where the government owns the
means of production. These are the nations with the companies from whom rich
Americans buy high-precision cars, watches, and other products. They have high
functioning “market economies,” but ones that in the fully realized spirit of the
New Deal include workers more fully in the governance of the capitalist

saying it would help give workers “their rightful voice in board rooms.” U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin Announces
New Legislation to Reverse Trump Administration Move to Silence Workers in Corporate America, TAMMY
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In a forthcoming article, my co-authors and I consider in detail the need for greater worker voice, and the
distance between where we are now and a system of effective ground-up, and not just top-down, codetermination
that would work in the American context. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Aneil Kovvali, & Oluwatomi O. Williams, Lifting
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companies for which they work.123 And Americans might remember that the
United States advocated for the strengthening of European co-determination in the
wake of World War II, as a bulwark against both fascism and communism. It was
the New Deal and European Social Democracy that ultimately defeated both
fascism and communism.124
Indeed, it is in the spirit of FDR that 21st Century New Dealers are acting on
many fronts to press for realistic change to make our economy work better for the
many. To echo Roosevelt himself, I believe we have less to fear from moving in a
direction that will make our economy more like that which exists in high
functioning societies like those in Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Germany,
than risking a return to the benighted, unequal world of the pre-New Deal — a
world that created inequality and instability that fueled the rise of fascism and
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communism. The risks that creates for more economic, racial and ethnic division,
and of also becoming a more corrupt society like Russia,125 are the ones we face if
we hew to a model of corporate governance built for a different time with
substantially different power dynamics. I’ll take the much less troubling risks that
flow from having corporate governance reform do its fair share in the larger effort
to becoming a nation that again makes a market economy spread prosperity
broadly, and this time one that does so durably for black people this time.126
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